Gold’s September Pullback is Healthy

September saw a healthy pullback in the rally for gold and silver bullion. Gold lost $51.30 to close the month at $1,472, a loss of 3.4%. YTD gold is up 14.8% as of 9/30/19. Silver bullion fell 7.4% for the month, but is up 9.7% as of 9/30/19. Gold equities retreated as well, but have gained 30.9% YTD as measured by Sprott Gold Miners ETF (SGDM).

Month of September 2019

Indicator 9/30/19 8/30/19 Change % Chg Analysis
Gold Bullion $1,472 $1,524 ($51.30 (3.4)% Short-term correction; support $1,450
Silver Bullion $17.00 $18.36 ($1.36) (7.4)% Pulled back to breakout level
Gold Equities (SGDM)1 $22.95 $25.66 ($2.70) (10.5)% Dollar strength creates headwinds
DXY US Dollar Index2 99.39 98.81 0.59 0.6% Steady rise
U.S. Treasury 10 YR Yield 1.66% 1.50% 0.16% 10.9% Short-term sideways before lower
German Bund 10 YR Yield (0.57)% (0.70)% 0.13% 18.6% EUR 5Y/5Y rolling over; yields to follow
U.S. 10 YR Real Yield 0.14% (0.04)% (0.19)% (190.0)% Still trending lower
Total Negative Debt ($Trillion) $14.9 $17.04 ($2.15) (12.6)% Pull back inline with yields
CFTC Gold Non-Comm Net Position3 and ETFs (Millions of Oz) 116.9 115.0 1.88 1.6% Buying continues; new all-time high

Gold Bullion Consolidates in September

Gold bullion traded in a sideways pattern for most of September before dropping sharply on the last day of the month. Silver, true to its high volatility nature, had a more significant trading range ($18.40 to $17.04). Gold positioning only had a slight pullback which was most likely profit-taking given the relatively small amount. Some hedging occurred likely as well.

Gold bullion remains in its uptrend from its 2018 summer low. The short-term pattern appears to be another consolidation phase. The main inputs in our gold bullion model all show long-term trends unchanged. All factors that we consider to be significantly correlating to gold bullion indicate that we are still in the early stages of a major long-term advance. After a very sharp rise, we see this correction as short term in nature.

Figure 1. Gold Correction is Likely Short Term

Gold Bullion Price
Source: Bloomberg as of September 30, 2019.

Our measure of CFTC net gold bullion plus known gold bullion ETF holdings reached an all-time high since we last published this chart. Accumulation remains steady, given that the long-term direction of yields remains lower, growth indicators continue to weaken and macro risks remain elevated and trending higher.

Despite the gold price consolidating in September, investors continued to aggressively increase their positions. This buying, combined with the 5Y/5Y inflation swap rolling over is very convincing to us. Our view is that gold should continue to move higher, in both the medium and long term.

Figure 2. Buyers Push Gold Positions to All-Time High

Gold Holdings Reach High
Source: Bloomberg as of September 30, 2019.

The Eventful Month That Was: The Macro View

The U.S.-China trade war continued to escalate in September. On September 1, the U.S. imposed a 15% tariff on $112 billion of Chinese consumer goods imports, and China began rolling out tariffs on the previously announced $75 billion of U.S. goods. The U.S. ISM Manufacturing Purchasing Managers Index (PMI)4 fell into contraction territory at 49.1 versus a 51.3 consensuses estimate, a big miss (a reading above 50 indicates expansion, while a reading below 50 indicates contraction).

The OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) cut its forecast for global growth from 3.3% to 2.9% for 2019, and from 3.4% to 3.0% in 2020 ― the lowest yearly growth rates since the GFC. The OECD also noted that downside risks continued to grow, citing the impacts of U.S.-China trade tensions and a no-deal Brexit. Despite the negative news, however, risk assets had a very sharp reversal higher. The news catalyst was a rumor that China and the U.S. would meet in October to resume trade talks. But we believe the more likely catalyst was China’s reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cut amounting to about $126 billion to help shore up its weakening economy. This cash injection, however, is unlikely to boost the overall Chinese economy as liquidity is already plentiful; it is the growing pressure from the escalating trade war and sluggish domestic demand that are sapping business and consumer confidence. What the RRR cut did have was an impact on overall market credit liquidity, and this was a factor for the risk-on rotation.

Central Bankers Continue to Fuel Easy Money

As the OECD noted, global growth remains weak. As expected, the ECB (European Central Bank) announced a new QE (quantitative easing) program of 20 billion Euros per month in asset purchases for an indefinite period starting November 1, a lowering of deposit rates by 10 basis points to -0.50%, and a call for more fiscal stimulus from EU countries. The ECB also reiterated its inflation targeting goal, to which we remain highly skeptical. The U.S. FOMC (Federal Open Market Committee) meeting occurred the following week, September 18, with the Fed cutting Fed Fund Rates by another 25 basis points, to a range of 1.75% to 2%. Guidance and language were mostly in line with consensus.

In mid-September, Saudi Arabia’s main oil processing facility was attacked, resulting in a loss of approximately 5.7 million barrels a day of oil production. The price of crude shot up dramatically, reflecting the significant near-term loss of oil output and most likely finally pricing in the geopolitical risk premium into the crude pricing strip. The main impact for gold would be via lower interest rates as climbing crude prices will act as a higher tax on a global economy that is already slowing rapidly.

At the end of the month, two additional events occurred that will likely impact financial markets going forward. The first is an impeachment inquiry on President Trump. The second was a Bloomberg report of a proposal to restrict or ban Chinese corporations from accessing U.S. capital markets. Possible delisting of Chinese equities, prohibiting government pension funds from investing in Chinese equities and other restrictions of capital were reported. There are more than 150 Chinese-listed companies on U.S. exchanges with a combined market capitalization of more than $1 trillion. Such a proposal would be yet another significant escalation, but this might push us from trade war to financial war.

Repo Madness and “QE-Lite”: A System Starved for Liquidity

At the time of the FOMC September 18 meeting, overnight repo rates (short for repurchase agreement, usually an overnight loan) shot up dramatically well above the Fed Funds Rate. The repo rate is the rate at which the central banks lend short-term money (usually overnight) to banks against Treasuries. Typically, the repo rate should not be materially higher than the Fed Funds Rate in a healthy funding market. The last time we saw repo rates shoot up was back in 2008 during the GFC when financial firms were too fearful of lending to one another.

There is not a very good answer as to why repo rates rose so dramatically last month (10% at the peak, above the 2008 level) and stayed elevated despite numerous Fed injections over the weeks. The best explanation we have heard is that there was a confluence of substantial funding needs at a time when the Fed balance sheet had shrunk too small relative to the amount of Treasuries held by commercial banks.

It appears that the funding market is now feeling the effects of the Fed’s quantitative tightening (there is always a delayed effect). The disconcerting part is that the Fed does not appear to have a sense of how significant the reserve shortfall was, nor the timing, as witnessed by the number and sheer size of the liquidity injections. The Fed is offering up to $70 billion a day in repurchase agreements until October 10 to provide enough reserve liquidity. If this temporary facility proves inadequate, a program to expand the Fed balance sheet may be in order (i.e., QE) to address this reserve scarcity. A new potential QE round is not (for now) a repeat of QE1, 2 and 3 to “save the economy.” This new QE round would be more of a “QE-Lite” to address the current reserve liquidity plumbing problem.

Moreover, this funding problem should be addressed quickly; setting a Fed Funds Rate and then having the overnight market rate well above the target range is negating the goal of lower interest rates. The repo market is signaling liquidity stress in the overnight market. If this stress broadens out, a much wider liquidity problem would be more significant to the markets.

A market measure of stress/liquidity we track is the LIBOR-OIS spread which is the difference between an interest rate with credit risk built-in and the risk-free rate. When LIBOR-OIS spreads are rising, it is a sign that the financial system is under some stress. In the past year and a half, the rolling 30-day correlation of gold bullion to LIBOR-OIS has broken out of its multi-year range and into a much higher correlation range (see Figure 1). Correlations are rising likely as a sign that liquidity and credit conditions are deteriorating.

Figure 3. Rolling 30-Day Correlation of LIBOR-OIS and Gold Bullion

Libor-OIS Gold Correlation
Source: Bloomberg as of September 30, 2019.

Another Macro Secular Trend Change?

S&P 500 Index implied stock correlation has broken out of its eight-year-long downtrend. The implied correlation of the S&P 500 constituent component returns has been declining since late 2011. When implied correlations are falling, individual company fundamentals tend to dominate, leading to more of a “stock pickers” market. When implied correlations are rising, it is indicative of macro market forces becoming more dominant in setting market pricing. As macro forces become more assertive in setting stock returns, correlations will rise.

Historically, when correlations rise, volatility tends to increase and the ability for diversification lessens. Rising correlation is not necessarily a bear or bull market call, but it is a potentially significant change in market dynamics. After a period of extended macroeconomic and market consistency, the recent sharp decline in expected economic growth and rising risk is starting to show up in longer-term secular trends. These early signs of potential secular trend shifts are not unexpected given: 1) how late we are in the current market cycle; 2) how dominant central bank policies are in pricing capital market assets; and 3) how synchronized this global slowdown has become.

S&P 500 implied correlation is likely ending its secular downtrend and is reversing into a higher correlation regime. As macroeconomic market conditions are expected to deteriorate further, we can expect implied correlations to rise.

Correlations underpin the multitude of algorithmic-driven risk-parity type portfolios.6 Depending on how and how quickly correlations change, there is a risk of a disorderly reversion in asset prices.

Figure 4. S&P 500 Implied Stock Correlation Breaks its Trend

S&P 500 Implied Stock Correlation

Figure 5. As Correlation Increases, Volatility Rises

Source: Bloomberg as of September 30, 2019.

Gold Bullion and Gold Equities Offer Low Correlation to the S&P 500

What does this mean for gold? There are two considerations. The first is that as correlations rise, non-correlated assets will become more valuable. Both gold bullion and gold equities have historically low to negative correlation to the S&P 500 and continue to exhibit this characteristic to date. Secondly, as correlations rise, volatility will likely increase.

Rising volatility will have significant ramifications for risk parity type funds. Risk parity funds focus on the allocation of risk, usually defined as volatility, rather than allocation of capital. During periods of rising volatility, allocations are reduced to bring down overall portfolio risk. When the allocation mix includes gold, the effect of gold’s non-correlated behavior, will lower the portfolio volatility. In addition to lower volatility, gold is likely to make the portfolio more efficient, especially if the overall market correlation is rising — yet another factor as to why gold is attractive now.

1 Sprott Gold Miners Exchange Traded Fund (NYSE: SGDM) seeks to deliver exposure to the Sprott Zacks Gold Miners Index (NYSE: ZAXSGDM). The Index aims to track the performance of large- to mid-capitalization gold companies whose stocks are listed on major U.S. exchanges.
2 The U.S. Dollar Index (USDX, DXY, DX) is an index (or measure) of the value of the United States dollar relative to a basket of foreign currencies, often referred to as a basket of U.S. trade partners' currencies.
3 Commodity Futures Trading Commission's (CFTC) Gold Non-Commercial Net Positions weekly report reflects the difference between the total volume of long and short gold positions existing in the market and opened by non-commercial (speculative) traders. The report only includes U.S. futures markets (Chicago and New York Exchanges). The indicator is a net volume of long gold positions in the United States.
4 The NYSE Arca Gold Miners Index (GDM) is a rules-based index designed to measure the performance of highly capitalized companies in the Gold Mining industry.
5 The Purchasing Managers Index (PMI) is a measure of the prevailing direction of economic trends in manufacturing. The purpose of the PMI is to provide information about current and future business conditions to company decision makers, analysts, and investors.
6 Risk-parity funds refer to a set of rule-based investment strategies that combine stocks, bonds and other financial assets. They are a counterweight to traditional portfolio investment strategies where investors are split between equities and bonds but equities end up carrying more of the risk.

Important Disclosure

Past performance is no guarantee of future results. You cannot invest directly in an index. Investments, commentary and statements are that of the author and may not be reflective of investments and commentary in other strategies managed by Sprott Asset Management USA, Inc., Sprott Asset Management LP, Sprott Inc., or any other Sprott entity or affiliate. Opinions expressed in this commentary are those of the author and may vary widely from opinions of other Sprott affiliated Portfolio Managers or investment professionals.

This content may not be reproduced in any form, or referred to in any other publication, without acknowledgment that it was produced by Sprott Asset Management LP and a reference to The opinions, estimates and projections (“information”) contained within this content are solely those of Sprott Asset Management LP (“SAM LP”) and are subject to change without notice. SAM LP makes every effort to ensure that the information has been derived from sources believed to be reliable and accurate. However, SAM LP assumes no responsibility for any losses or damages, whether direct or indirect, which arise out of the use of this information. SAM LP is not under any obligation to update or keep current the information contained herein. The information should not be regarded by recipients as a substitute for the exercise of their own judgment. Please contact your own personal advisor on your particular circumstances. Views expressed regarding a particular company, security, industry or market sector should not be considered an indication of trading intent of any investment funds managed by Sprott Asset Management LP. These views are not to be considered as investment advice nor should they be considered a recommendation to buy or sell. SAM LP and/or its affiliates may collectively beneficially own/control 1% or more of any class of the equity securities of the issuers mentioned in this report. SAM LP and/or its affiliates may hold a short position in any class of the equity securities of the issuers mentioned in this report. During the preceding 12 months, SAM LP and/or its affiliates may have received remuneration other than normal course investment advisory or trade execution services from the issuers mentioned in this report.

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Paul Wong
Paul Wong, CFA, Market Strategist
Paul has held several roles at Sprott, including Senior Portfolio Manager. He has more than 30 years of investment experience, specializing in investment analysis for natural resources investments. He is a trained geologist and CFA holder.
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